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Abstract
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a two dimensional heterogeneous good among
multiple players. Applications include division of land as well as ad space in print and
electronic media. Classical cake cutting protocols primarily consider a one-dimensional
resource, or allocate each player multiple infinitesimally small “pieces”. In practice, however,
the two dimensional shape of the allotted piece is of crucial importance in many applications
(e.g. squares or bounded aspect-ratio rectangles are most useful for building houses, as
well as advertisements). We thus introduce and study the problem of fair two-dimensional
division wherein the allotted plots must be of some restricted two-dimensional geometric
shape(s). Adding this geometric constraint re-opens most questions and challenges related
to cake-cutting. Indeed, even the elementary proportionality fairness criteria can no longer
be guaranteed in all cases. In this paper we thus examine the level of proportionality that
can be guaranteed, providing both impossibility results (for proportionality that cannot be
guaranteed), and algorithmic constructions (for proportionality that can be guaranteed).
We focus primarily on the case when the cake is a rectilinear polygon and the allotted plots
must be squares or bounded aspect-ratio rectangles.
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1 Introduction
Fair division of land has been an important issue since the dawn of human history. One of the
classic fair division protocols, “I cut - you choose”, is already described in the Bible (Genesis
13) as a method for dividing land between two people. The modern study of fair division,
commonly termed cake cutting, began in the 1940’s. The first challenge was conceptual - how
should “fairness” be defined when the cake is heterogeneous and different people may assign
different values to subsets of the cake? Steinhaus [1948] introduced the elementary and most
basic fairness requirement, now termed proportionality : each of the n players should get a share
which he values as worth at least 1/n of the value of the entire cake. Steinhaus [1948] also
presented an elegant algorithm for proportionally dividing a cake among an arbitrary number
of players. Since then, many other desirable properties of cake partitions have been studied,
including: envy-freeness [e.g. Brams and Taylor, 1996, Su, 1999], equitability [e.g. Jones, 2002],
social welfare maximization [e.g. Cohler et al., 2011, Bei et al., 2012, Caragiannis et al., 2012],
computational efficiency [e.g. Even and Paz, 1984, Edmonds et al., 2008, Balkanski et al., 2014]
and truthfulness [e.g. Mossel and Tamuz, 2010, Chen et al., 2013, Cole et al., 2013]. See the
books by Brams and Taylor [1996], Robertson and Webb [1998] and a recent survey by Procaccia
[2013] for more information.
Interestingly, over decades of research on the cake-cutting problem, little to no attention
has been given to the case of dividing a two-dimensional good. Indeed, most all work on cake
cutting explicitly assumes that the cake and the allotted pieces are one-dimensional intervals. 1
This is usually justified by the claim that higher dimensional settings can always be projected
onto one dimension, and hence, fairness in one-dimension implies fairness in higher dimensions.
However, projecting back from the one dimension, the resulting two-dimensional plots are thin
rectangular slivers, of little use in most practical applications; it is hard to build a house on a
10×1, 000 meter plot even though its area is a full hectare, and a thin 1-inch wide advertizement
space would ill-serve most advertises, regardless of its height. Thus, in most applications, the
geometric shape of the allotted piece is of prime importance. Hence, we seek divisions in which
the allotted plots must be of some restricted family of “usable” two-dimensional shapes, e.g.
squares or rectangles of bounded aspect-ratio.
Adding this geometric constraint re-opens most questions and challenges related to cake-
cutting. Indeed, even the elementary proportionality fairness criteria can no longer be guaran-
teed, as illustrated by the following example. Consider a square cake and two players, both with
a uniform valuation function over the entire cake. It is easy to see that if each player must get
a square plot then the most both players can get is 1/4 of the cake (if one gets more - the other
must get less). Thus, even in this simple case, proportionality cannot be attained.
In this work we initiate the study of two-dimensional fair division with geometric constraints,
focusing on proportionality. Since full proportionality cannot be guaranteed, we ask what level of
proportionality can be guaranteed? That is, since a 1/n fraction is not attainable, what (other)
fraction of (the value of) entire cake can we guarantee that each player get? Note that a-priori
it is not even clear that a 1/O(n) fraction can be guaranteed. For this question, we provide
both impossibility results (for proportionality levels that cannot be attained), and algorithmic
constructions (for the proportionality that can be guaranteed).
Naturally, the attainable level of proportionality may depend on the both the desired shape
of the allotted plots and the shape of the entire cake. In this work we focus on case where the
allotted plots must be square or rectangles of some bounded aspect-ratio (fat rectangles) and
the original cake is square, rectangular, a rectilinear polygon, a quarter plane, a half plane or
the entire unbounded plane. For each, we provide upper and lower bounds on the guaranteeable
proportionality level. All the bounds are tight up to constant factors, with a multiplicative gap
1Several authors studied a circular cake [Thomson, 2007, Brams et al., 2008, Barbanel et al., 2009], but it is
still a one-dimensional circle and the pieces are contiguous one-dimensional arcs.
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of at most 2.
1.1 Our results
We prove a multitude of upper and lower bounds, for different original cake shapes and different
prescribed plot shapes. Our main results can be summarized in the following two theorems.
Theorem 1. With a square original cake that must be divided among n ≥ 2 players, each of
whom must get a square plot:
(a) There exists a polynomial time algorithm that allots each player a plot worth at least 14n−4
of the value of the entire cake (according to the player’s own valuation).
(b) The largest proportion that can be guaranteed to all players (simultaneously) is 12n , re-
gardless of run-time considerations.
Thus, the algorithm of (a) is tight up to a factor of 2. We note that the algorithm of (a)
does not require full knowledge of the entire valuation functions, but rather only makes use of
a polynomial number of queries to the players, where the queries are analogous to the standard
ones used in the cake-cutting literature [e.g. Even and Paz, 1984, Robertson and Webb, 1998].
We also note that the algorithm of (a) uses a recursive halving technique that can also be
used with cakes and plots of other shapes, such as fat triangles, trapezoids or multi-dimensional
cubes. The upper bound of (b) holds even when we allow the pieces to be fat rectangles - rect-
angles with a bounded aspect ratio. It, too, can be extended to multi-dimensional cubes.
Theorem 2. For an original cake in the shape of the unbounded plane, to be divided among
n ≥ 4 players, each of whom must get a square piece, there exists a polynomial time algorithm
that allots each player a plot worth at least 12n−4 of the value of the entire cake (according to the
player’s own valuation).
The trivial upper bounds is 1
n
, so this algorithm too is tight up to a factor of 2.
The algorithm for dividing an unbounded plane is based on an algorithm for dividing a
quarter-plane, which is in turn based on an algorithm for dividing a rectilinear polygon with two
sides unbounded. This latter algorithm is interesting in its own right. It guarantees each player
a value of at least 12n−2+CoverNum where CoverNum is the smallest number of squares required
to cover the polygon. This guarantee is tight.
Techniques. Introducing the geometric constraints not only re-opens all the known cake-
cutting results, but also deems most of its techniques unusable. Thus, we must develop new
proof and algorithmic techniques, aimed at this new problem. For the upper bounds, we develop
a new generic proof technique, which employs a recursive structure of “water pools in the desert”
for the construction of hard instances. For the algorithmic constructions, we develop two new
algorithmic techniques. The one, employed for the bounded cake shapes, uses recursive guillotine
cuts - axis-parallel cuts running from one end of a piece to another. The cuts are determined
by queries which resemble the mark and eval queries in the classic Robertson-Webb model
[Robertson and Webb, 1998]. The other technique, employed for the unbounded cake shapes,
uses a process by which players are allowed to draw minimal squares in specified locations within
the cake and a certain square is selected and “carved” from the cake using non-guillotine cuts.
1.2 Related research
Both algorithmic techniques make heavy use of notions from computational geometry, such as
minimum polygon covering and maximum independent set. They are also related to problems
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such as optimal square packing. Relevant references are given in Section 4.
We found only few cake-cutting papers which explicitly consider a two-dimensional cake.
Two of them discuss the problem of dividing a disputed territory between several bordering
countries, with the constraint that each country should get a piece adjacent to its current
border: Hill [1983] proved that such a partition exists and Beck [1987] complemented this proof
with a division procedure.
Iyer and Huhns [2009] describe a procedure that asks each of the n players to draw n disjoint
rectangles on the map of the two-dimensional cake. These rectangles are supposed to represent
the “desired areas” of the player. The procedure tries to give each player one of his n desired
areas. However, it does not succeed unless each rectangle proposed by an individual intersects at
most one other rectangle drawn by any other player. If even a single rectangle of Alice intersects
two rectangles of George (for example), then the procedure fails and no player gets any piece.
1.3 Paper structure
We proceed by formally describing our model in section 2. Then we present our negative results
(impossibility proofs) in section 3 and our positive results (division algorithms) in section 4. In
both sections, we present both generic lemmas that are relevant to every cake and every family
of usable shapes, and instantiations of these lemmas for cakes that are rectilinear polygons and
pieces that are squares or fat rectangles.
2 The Model
There is a cake C which is a measurable subset of the 2-dimensional plane. The cake can be
infinite. C has to be divided among a group of players N = {1, ..., n}, giving every player i ∈ N
a measurable piece Pi ⊆ C such that the pieces are pairwise disjoint. Some parts of the cake
may remain unallocated (i.e. free disposal is allowed).
There is a family S of geometric shapes which are considered the “usable shapes”. Every
allocated piece must be usable, i.e. ∀i: Pi ∈ S.
Every player i ∈ N has a subjective value measure Vi, assigning to every measurable subset
of C a non-negative finite number. In the context of land division, the value measure represents
the subjective quality of the land and may depend upon factors such as the amount of fertile
soil it contains, the probability of finding oil in it, etc. We require Vi(C) to be finite even when
C is infinite. The value measures Vi are additive, i.e. the value of a whole is equal to the sum
of the values of its parts. We also assume that the measures are absolutely continuous with
respect to area (or just continuous for short), i.e., the value of a piece with an area of 0 is 0;
hence there is no difference in value between open and closed shapes with the same interior.
Continuity implies that there are no singular points with positive value - a property usually
termed non-atomicity.[Hill and Morrison, 2010]
The fairness of a given allocation {P1, ..., Pn} is evaluated in terms of its proportionality level,
defined as the proportion of the cake value enjoyed by the least fortunate player:
Prop({P1, ..., Pn}, {V1, ..., Vn}) = min
i∈N
Vi(Pi)
Vi(C)
An allocation with proportionality 1
n
is usually called a proportional allocation. It is well-
known that without geometric constraints a proportional allocation exists for every combination
of continuous value measures. However, this is not necessarily true when the plots are required to
have a certain geometric shape. Hence, our research question is: given a cake C and a family S,
what is the largest proportionality level that can be attained for every combination of continuous
value measures? We call this number the proportionality level of C relative to S:
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Prop(C, 1, Squares) ≤ 1
2
Prop(C, 2, Squares) ≤ 1
4
Prop(C, 2, Squares) ≤ 1
3
Prop(C, 3, Squares) ≤ 1
5
Figure 1: Desert lands with water pools, illustrating impossibility results for 1, 2 and 3 players.
Prop(C,n, S) = inf sup Prop({P1, ..., Pn}, {V1, ..., Vn})
where the infimum is taken over all n-tuples of continuous value measures {V1, ..., Vn} and
the supremum is taken over all allocations {P1, ..., Pn} of S-shaped pieces of C to n players with
these value measures.2
The classic algorithms for proportional cake-cutting [e.g. Steinhaus, 1948] prove that
Prop(Any shape, n, all shapes) = 1
n
. One-dimensional algorithms with contiguous pieces [e.g.
Su, 1999] prove that Prop(Interval, n, intervals) = 1
n
and when translated to two dimensions
they yield: Prop(Rectangle, n, rectangles) = 1
n
. However, none of these algorithms considers
constraints that are two-dimensional in nature such as square pieces. Such two-dimensional
constraints are the focus of our research.
Our challenge in the rest of this paper will be to calculate Prop(C,n, S) for various cakes
and families of shapes. The calculation is done in two steps: (a) Proving an upper bound
Prop(C,n, S) ≤ f . This is done by showing a single combination of n value measures on C,
for which no allocation of shapes from S can have proportionality above f . (b) Proving a
lower bound Prop(C,n, S) ≥ f . This is done by describing an algorithm which finds, for every
combination of n value measures on C, an allocation of shapes from S with proportionality at
least f . These two steps are handled in sections 3 and 4 respectively.
Most of our results consider square pieces. While a square is a convenient and usable shape,
a rectangular land-plot can also be useful if it is not too thin. The following definition, adapted
from the computational geometry literature [e.g. Agarwal et al., 1995, Katz, 1997], quantifies
this intuition:
Definition 2.1. For R ≥ 1, a d-dimensional object is called R-fat if it contains a d-cube with
side-length x and is contained in a d-cube with parallel faces and side-length R · x, for some
x > 0. In particular, an R-fat rectangle is a rectangle having length/width ratio at most R.
So a square is 1-fat and also 2-fat; a 10-by-20 rectangle is 2-fat but not 1-fat; a right-angled
isosceles triangle is 2-fat; a circle is
√
2-fat; etc.
3 Impossibility Results
3.1 One player
In this section we prove upper bounds relevant to Theorems 1 and 2. We start our discussion
with some simple examples that provide intuition on proving impossibility results.
First, consider Robinson Crusoe, a single player on a lonely island. Without geometric
constraints he can of course have the entire island so his proportion is 1, but with geometric
constraints he might have to settle for less. For example, if the island is 10-by-20 and the
usable shapes are squares, then for some value measures (e.g. the uniform measure) only half
2Note that this is different than the egalitarian value, which is the largest proportionality level for specific value
measures, i.,e. only the supremum without the infimum. Finding the egalitarian value for specific value measures
is a difficult problem even without geometric constraints [see e.g. Dall’Aglio and Di Luca, 2012, Aumann et al.,
2013].
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the value can be used: Prop(10 × 20 rectangle, n = 1, Squares) ≤ 12 . If the island is 10-
by-15, a similar upper bound can be proved by considering the island in Figure 1/Left. This
is a desert with two equal-sized water pools (the small blue squares). The water pools are
far apart so no square in C intersects more than one pool. If Robinson’s value measure is
proportional to the amount of water then he cannot have more than half the total value; hence
Prop(10 × 15 rectangle, n = 1, Squares) ≤ 12 . Note that the pools in the figure are squares,
but we would get the same result if the pools were circles or any other shape, as long as it is
sufficiently small.
This construction can be generalized for arbitrary rectangular islands, proving that Prop(L×
1 rectangle, n = 1, Squares) ≤ 1⌈L⌉ . A generalization to arbitrary shapes is given by the
following definition and lemma:
Definition 3.1. Let C be a shape and S a family of shapes. (a) An S-independent set in C
is a set of squares in C no two of which are covered by a single shape from S contained in
C. (b) The S-independence number of C, IndepNum(C,S), is the maximum cardinality of an
S-independent set in C.
The independence number is a geometric property of the shape of C and S. For example, for
L ≥ 1, IndepNum(L× 1 rectangle, Squares) = ⌈L⌉ because ⌈L⌉ sufficiently small squares can
be arranged in equal intervals along a long side of the rectangle such that no two of them can
be covered by one square. Some more examples are illustrated in Figure 2/Left. This geometric
property is related to proportionality by the following lemma, which is easily proved using the
water-pools scheme we used in previous example:
Lemma 3.1. For every shape C and family S: Prop(C,n = 1, S) ≤ 1
IndepNum(C,S)
Hence, for example, in an L-shaped island, Robinson Crusoe may have to settle for a utility
of only 13 (if he wants squares) or
1
2 (if he wants rectangles).
3.2 Many players
Now consider what happens when Friday joins the island. Now, even if the island is square,
a proportional division with square plots may be impossible. In the introduction we already
discussed an example which proves that Prop(Square, n = 2, Squares) ≤ 14 . When the island
is 10-by-20, a similar bound can be proved by considering a desert with pools as in Figure
1/Middle. There are 4 equal-sized pools. At most one square intersects two or more pools:
a square intersecting the pool at the far east cannot intersect any other pool, and a square
intersecting two or more pools at the west does not leave room for any other square intersecting
two pools. Hence, at least one of the partners will have at most a single pool and a proportion
of 14 , so Prop(10× 20 rectangle, n = 2, Squares) ≤ 14 .
In this paper we consider not only finite cakes but also infinite ones, such as a quarter-
plane or even an unbounded plane. When dividing an infinite cake we allow the pieces to
be infinite too. For example, when the usable shapes are squares we treat a quarter-plane as a
square (with infinite side-length). Even with infinite pieces, a proportional division is not always
guaranteed. Consider for example the quarter-plane in Figure 1/Middle, having 3 pools. Assume
the horizontal and vertical distance between the pools is 1 and the diameter of each pool is ǫ.
Then every square intersecting at least two pools must have side-length at least 1−2ǫ. It is clear
that there is room for at most one such square. Hence Prop(Quarter plane, n = 2, Squares) ≤
1
3 . Note that the bound is valid both for axis-parallel squares and for rotated squares, although
the geometric calculations required for proving the latter case are more laborious.
In order to prove impossibility results for an arbitrary number of players, we use the following
scheme, which is a generalization of the pools scheme used in the previous examples. Given a
cake C and a family of usable shapes S, we find an arrangement of m pools contained in C. By
5
IndepNum(C,Rectangles)=
IndepNum(C,Squares)=3
IndepNum(C,Squares)=3 IndepNum(C,Rectangles)=2
c
Prop(C,n = 3, Squares) ≤ 1
7
Figure 2: Left: Independence numbers. Right: impossibility result based on independence numbers.
“pool” we mean a small circle or square or any other shape having positive area. If at most n−1
disjoint shapes from S intersect two or more pools, then Prop(C, n, S) ≤ 1
m
, because at least
one of n players will have to live with at most a single pool. Note that this scheme requires only
a single piecewise-uniform value measure. Hence all impossibility results proved by this scheme
are valid even for n players having an identical valuation function which is piecewise-uniform.
As an example of using this scheme, consider Figure 1/Right, having 5 pools where at most 2
disjoint squares intersect two pools. This shows that Prop(Quarter plane, n = 3, Squares) ≤ 15 .
This construction can be generalized recursively and we get the following upper bound, which
is proved in Appendix A:
Claim 3.1. For every n ≥ 1, Prop(Quarter plane, n, Squares) ≤ 12n−1
This upper bound is also trivially true when the cake is a (bounded) square. But for a square
we can add a pool at the north-eastern corner and get a slightly tighter bound:
Claim 3.2. For every n ≥ 2, Prop(Square, n, Squares) ≤ 12n
Lemma 3.1 shows the dependency of proportionality on the geometry of the cake. Claims
3.1 and 3.2 show the dependency of proportionality on the number of players. The next claim
combines the two factors. It is about a rectilinear polygon - a polygon in which all angles
are multiples of 90◦. Proof details are given in Appendix A. Figure 2/Right illustrates the
construction for k = 3 and n = 3, having 7 pools where at most 2 disjoint squares intersect two
pools.
Claim 3.3. Let C be a rectilinear polygon and let k = IndepNum(C,Squares). Then for every
n ≥ 1: Prop(C, n, Squares) ≤ 12n−2+k
So far we focused on square pieces. Intuitively we could think that allowing fat rectangles (see
Definition 2.1) instead of just squares should considerably increase the attainable proportionality
level. Surprisingly, this is not the case:
Claim 3.4. ∀n ≥ 1,R ≥ 1, Prop(Quarter plane, n, R fat rectangles) ≤ 12n−1
The proof is essentially the same as Claim 3.3 - we just have to use sufficiently small pools.
This upper bound obviously also holds for bounded squares, though the slightly tighter bound
of Claim 3.2 holds only for R < 2.
Since an ∞-fat rectangle is just an arbitrary rectangle, we have from classic cake-cutting:
Prop(Square, n, ∞ fat rectangles) = 1
n
. Contrasting this with Claim 3.4 we see a surprising
discontinuity of the Prop function at R =∞. Thus, if the players agree to use any rectangular
plot, they can receive their proportional share of 1
n
, but if they insist on using R-fat rectangles,
even when R is very large, they might have to settle for about half of this share.
Claim 3.3 generalizes to R-fat rectangles only when the rectilinear polygon C is simply-
connected (hole-free). The proof relies on a geometric lemma which guarantees the existence of
an independent set with a corner square [Gill et al., 2013]:
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Claim 3.5. Let C be a hole-free rectilinear polygon and let k = IndepNum(C, R fat rectangles).
Then for every n ≥ 1 and R <∞: Prop(C, n, R fat rectangles) ≤ 12n−2+k .
In particular: Prop(L× 1 rectangle, n, R fat rectangles) ≤ 1
2n−2+⌈ L
R
⌉
.
For the case R =∞: Prop(C, n, rectangles) ≤ 1
n−1+k .
Regarding a half-plane, the following claim can be proved very similarly to Claim 3.4:
Claim 3.6. ∀n ≥ 1,R ≥ 1, Prop(Half plane, n, R fat rectangles) ≤ 1
⌈ 3n
2
⌉−1
We mention without proof the following generalization of Claims 3.1 and 3.2 to multi-
dimensional cubes. Let C be a d-cube with δ ≤ d unbounded sides, all in different dimensions
(i.e. at most one side is unbounded in each dimension). Then:
Claim 3.7. ∀n ≥ 2: Prop(d cubewith δ unbounded sides, d cubes) ≤ 1
d(n−2)+(2d−δ+δ)
4 Algorithms
4.1 One player
We begin the algorithmic part of this paper in Robinson Crusoe’s lonely island. Robinson
can achieve a valuable land-plot using the following definition and lemma, which are duals of
Definition 3.1 and Lemma 3.1:
Definition 4.1. Let C be a shape and S a family of shapes. (a) An S-cover of C is a set of
shapes in S whose union equals C. (b) The S-cover number of C, CoverNum(C,S), is the
minimum cardinality of an S-cover of C.
Lemma 4.1. (Covering Lemma) For every shape C and family S: Prop(C,n = 1, S) ≥
1
CoverNum(C,S)
Proof. Let k = CoverNum(C,S) and let {C1, ..., Ck} be an S-cover of C. By definition ∪ki=1Ci =
C. By additivity Σki=1V (Ci) ≥ V (C). Hence for at least one i: V (Ci) ≥ V (C)k . By selecting this
Ci, which is a member of S, Robinson can enjoy a proportion of at least
1
k
.
In general, the computational problem of finding a minimum covering is NP-hard.3 There are
two important cases in which it is known to be polynomial: (a) When C is a hole-free rectilinear
polygon and S the family of squares [Bar-Yehuda and Ben-Hanoch, 1996]; (b) When C is an
orthogonally-convex rectilinear polygon and S the family of rectangles [Franzblau and Kleitman,
1984].
Comparing the Covering Lemma to Lemma 3.1 raises the question of when the two bounds
for a single player coincide, i.e. when does CoverNum(C,S) = IndepNum(C,S)? Two re-
sults from computational geometry provide two important cases in which they are equal:4 (a)
When C is a hole-free rectilinear polygon and S the family of squares [Albertson and O’Keefe,
1981]; (b) When C is an orthogonally-convex rectilinear polygon and S the family of rectangles
[Chaiken et al., 1981]. In these two cases we have a complete solution for a single player - a
polynomial-time algorithm attaining the best possible proportionality: Prop(C,n = 1, S) =
1
IndepNum(C,S) =
1
CoverNum(C,S) . Note that the latter two papers also provide concrete exam-
ples of rectilinear polygons for which CoverNum(C,S) > IndepNum(C,S). We do not know
the exact value of Prop(C,n = 1, S) in these cases. Indeed, the problem of cake-cutting with
geometric constraints provides interesting open questions even when there is only a single player!
3The Wikipedia page https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polygon_covering provides an up-to-date survey.
4We are grateful to Joseph O’Rourke for kindly providing these references. Note that in the references, an
S-independent set when S is the family of squares is termed “anti-square” and similarly an S-independent set
when S is the family of rectangles is termed “anti-rectangle”.
7
v = 1
v ≥ 14 v = 14
v = 34
Figure 3: Prop(Square, n = 2, Squares) ≥ 1
4
4.2 Many players
Following the common practice in cake-cutting since Steinhaus [1948], our protocols for n > 1
players provide worst-case guarantees, i.e., each player has a strategy that guarantees a piece
having a certain value, regardless of what the other players do. When describing such a strategy,
we refer to it as the safe strategy of the player.
Consider first a case of two players on a square island. In section 3 we saw an upper bound
of 14 on the proportionality in this case. The problem of how to attain this proportionality is
a nice puzzle which can be solved by a very simple protocol: ask each player to draw a square
corner, give the smallest square to its owner and the rest of the cake to the other player.
Having described the protocol, we now describe a safe strategy: draw the smallest corner
square having a value of 14 . To find this square, partition the cake to a 2× 2 grid. By additivity
at least one of the quarters must have value at least 14 . Shrink it towards its corner until the
shrunk square has value exactly 14 (see Figure 3). Now, either you receive this square, or the
other player receives a smaller square and you receive the remaining L-shape which has value
at least 34 . But the cover number of the L-shape is 3, hence by the Covering Lemma you can
get from it a utility of at least 14 . The protocol and the safe strategy together prove that:
Prop(Square, n = 2, Squares) = 14 .
Our algorithms use two types of queries, which are analogous to the “mark” and “eval” queries
used by classic cake-cutting algorithms [e.g. Robertson and Webb, 1998, Woeginger and Sgall,
2007]:
In a mark query, each player should mark a piece he bids to receive from the cake. The
protocol rules restrict the marks such that each bid must either contain or be contained in each
other bid. Now the protocol selects a smallest bid (which is contained in all other bids), gives
it to its bidder and divides the remainder of the cake recursively among the remaining n − 1
players.
As an example, if C is a rectangle and S the family of rectangles, a possible mark query is:
“bid a rectangle whose western side coincides with the western side of C”. A safe strategy for a
player with value measure V is to bid a rectangle r with V (r) = V (C)
n
. This is always possible
thanks to the continuity of V (C). A player using this strategy is guaranteed a rectangle with
value at least V (C)
n
, thus re-proving a result already known from 1-dimensional cake-cutting:
Prop(Rectangle,Rectangles) = 1
n
.
In an eval query, the protocol partitions C tom ≥ 2 disjoint sub-cakes Cj , having ⊔mj=1Cj =
C. Each player i should evaluate every sub-cake Cj by providing a non-negative integer P
i
j . P
stands for “partners” and represents the number of players with which i is willing to share Cj
(including player i himself). The protocol rules obligate each player to make sure the sum of his
partner numbers is at least n, i.e.: ∀i : Σmj=1P ij ≥ n. The protocol then partitions the players to
m disjoint groups Gj in a way that respects the players’ preferences: ∀i, j: i ∈ Gj =⇒ P ij ≥ |Gj |.
I.e., every player in group j has indicated a willingness to share the sub-cake Cj with the number
of partners in the group. This partition can be carried out by Algorithm 1, described in Appendix
B. Finally the protocol recursively divides every sub-cake Cj to the players in group Gj .
As an example, if C is an archipelago made of disjoint m rectangular islands and S is the
family of rectangles, a possible eval query is: “evaluate each of them islands”. A safe strategy for
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a player with value measure V is to let Pj = ⌊V (Cj )V (C) · (n+m− 1)⌋. By the properties of the floor
function, Pj >
V (Cj)
V (C) ·(n+m−1)−1 and the sum satisfies: Σmj=1P ij > (n+m−1)Σmj=1
V (Cj )
V (C) −m =
(n +m− 1) · 1−m = n− 1. But the sum is an integer so it must be at least n, in compliance
with the protocol rules. Again by the properties of the floor functionm, Pj ≤ V (Cj )V (C) · (n+m−1),
so a player using this strategy is guaranteed to share a rectangle valued V (Cj) with at most
V (Cj)
V (C) · (n+m− 1) partners and receive a rectangle valued V (C)(n+m−1) . This proves the following
new result: Prop(mdisjoint rectangles, Rectangles) ≥ 1
n+m−1 .
5
The algorithms we describe in the following subsections use sophisticated combinations of
mark and eval queries to handle more complicated scenarios.
4.3 Guillotine algorithms
In this subsection we prove the lower bounds of Theorem 1. To give some intuition, we start
with a looser bound which is simpler to prove.
Claim 4.1. For every n ≥ 2, Prop(Square, n, Squares) ≥ 16n−8
Proof. (Sketch) A square cake C can be divided using the following sequence of two queries:
(1) Eval query: C is partitioned to 4 sub-squares in a 2 × 2 grid. Each player provides
4 integers indicating the number of partners with which he is willing to share each of the 4
quarters; the numbers must sum up to at least n. The players are partitioned to 4 groups using
Algorithm 1. If not all players are in the same group then we can just divide each sub-square
recursively to its players. If all n players are in the same group, corresponding to a single quarter
Cj, we proceed to the next query:
(2) mark query: each player should bid an L-shape using an L-shaped mark inside the
quarter Cj . For example, if Cj is the south-western quarter of C then each player should draw a
square cornered at the south-western corner of C and bid the L-shape outside that square. The
protocol picks a smallest L-shape CL and allows its bidder to select a single square contained in
CL. The protocol then uses a guillotine cut to separate this square from the C \ CL (note that
C \CL is a corner square contained in the quarter Cj). The winning bidder receives his selected
square and C \CL is divided recursively among the remaining n− 1 players. A flow-chart of the
protocol is illustrated in Figure 5. Appendix D explains the safe strategy and proves that this
strategy guarantees a value of at least V (C)6n−8 .
We call the coefficient of n in the denominator of Prop, the proportionality coefficient. The
proportionality coefficient in the impossibility results of section 3 is 2 while the proportionality
coefficient in the algorithm of Claim 4.1 is 6; this is a large proportionality gap which we want
to close. One way to narrow the proportionality gap is to allow the pieces to be fat rectangles
(Definition 2.1). The improved bound is valid not only for square cakes but also for cakes that
are 2-fat rectangles. The algorithm uses a sequence of four queries: an eval query, a mark query,
another eval query and another eval query. The details are given in Appendix E and illustrated
by a flow chart in Figure 6. We get:
Claim 4.2. For every n ≥ 2, Prop(2 fat rectangle, n, 2 fat rectangles) ≥ 14n−5
With some more effort, the proportionality coefficient can be reduced to 4 even for square
pieces. To this end we use a pair of algorithms that call each other recursively: an algorithm
for dividing a 2-fat rectangle with all sides bounded and an algorithm for dividing a rectangle
with one of its longer sides unbounded (the meaning of an unbounded side is that some of the
pieces may flow over the border). The algorithm details are given in Appendix F and illustrated
in Figures 7 and 8. We get a pair of results:
5It is easy to show that this bound is tight by using our water pools scheme from Section 3.
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Figure 4: Left: Staircase with k = 4 corners (numbered 1,...,4), and its 4 covering squares.
Middle: Corner squares (solid) with a diagonal (dashed) representing at (the taxicab distance from the
origin). The blue square at corner 2 is the winning square as its taxicab distance is minimal.
Right: Cutting the blue square and its shadow. The remainder has k′ = 3 corners.
Claim 4.3. ∀n ≥ 2:
(a)Prop(2 fat rectanglewith all sides bounded, n, squares) ≥ 14n−4
(b)Prop(Rectanglewith a long side unbounded, n, squares) ≥ 14n−5
Theorem 1 is proved by combining Claims 3.2 and 4.3(a).
We briefly mention without proof two generalizations of Theorem 1. First, if C is a rectangle
with aspect ratio L and the pieces are fat rectangles then:
Claim 4.4. Prop(L× 1 rectangle, n, R fat rectangles) ≥ 1
4n−6+⌈
max(2,L)
R
⌉
Second, let C be a d-dimensional cube with δ ≤ d unbounded sides, all in different dimensions
(i.e. at most one side is unbounded in each dimension). Then:
Claim 4.5. ∀n ≥ 2: Prop(d cubewith δ unbounded sides, d cubes) ≥ 1
(2d−1+2)(n−2)+(2d−δ+δ)
Currently this is the best we know to do with guillotine cuts. In the following section we
introduce a new algorithmic technique with which we can both narrow the proportionality gap
and handle more diverse cakes.
4.4 Staircase algorithms
In this section we prove Theorem 2. We start by an intuitive presentation of the ideas behind
the algorithm which we use to fairly divide the plane. It is easier to think about the algorithm
as if it’s trying to divide the north-eastern quarter-plane, i.e. the cake is like a square with two
sides unbounded.6 Recall from Claim 3.1 that the upper bound for this case is 12n−1 . We want
to begin by giving someone a square starting at the south western corner, which is worth 12n−1
to her. Ideally, we would like to give that square to a player who would take the smallest such
square, and recurse. However, when we try to do this we run into trouble, as the cake is no
longer square - instead it is an L-shape. Worse, if (say) we carve a second square next to the
first which is larger than the first square, the cake no longer resembles an L, and becomes a
more complicated shape.
To be able to run recursively, the algorithm accepts as input a rectilinear polygonal domain
with two unbounded sides, which for brevity we call “staircase” because of its shape (see Figure
4/Left). A staircase can be characterized by the number of inner corners which we denote by
k. Clearly CoverNum(C,Squares) = IndepNum(C,Squares) = k, hence by Claim 3.3 the
upper bound on proportionality is 12n−2+k . Fortunately, this upper bound can be attained by
our staircase algorithm, whose details are given in Appendix G:
6Algorithms for partially-unbounded squares has been recently studied by computational geometricians with
relation to the task of online square packing. For example, Fekete and Hoffmann [2013] studies online square
packing with zero or two unbounded sides while Fekete et al. [2014] studies online square packing with one
unbounded side.
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Claim 4.6. If C is a staircase-shaped polygonal domain having k corners, then Prop(C,n, Squares) =
1
2n−2+k . In particular, Prop(Quarter plane, n, Squares) =
1
2n−1 .
The algorithm uses only mark queries: it lets each player draw squares in one or more corners
of the staircase and selects the “best” square. Surprisingly, it turns out that the best square
to choose is not the smallest one but the one with the smallest taxicab distance from its center
to the origin (see Figure 4/Middle). After a square is allocated, the “shadow” of the square
should also be discarded in order to keep the cake in a staircase shape (see Figure 4/Right). It is
possible to prove that, if the square with the smallest taxicab distance is removed together with
its shadow, then the value of the remaining cake to the remaining n − 1 agents is sufficiently
large such that they can continue the division recursively. See Appendix G for more details.
To divide a half-plane, we can partition it to two quarter-planes:
Claim 4.7. Prop(Half plane, n, Squares) ≥ 12n−2
Proof. Start with a singlemark query. Assume the cake is the half-plane y ≥ 0 and there are n
players who value it as 2n−2. Ask each player to draw a vertical line such that the value on the
west of the line is exactly 1. Cut the cake at the most western line and give the entire quarter-
plane to the west of the line to the player who drew that line. The remaining n−1 players value
the remaining cake, which has two unbounded sides, as at least 2n − 3 = 2(n − 1) − 1. Divide
it among them using the staircase algorithm of Claim 4.6.
Similarly we can divide an unbounded plane by partitioning it to two half-planes. This gives
our Theorem 2: Prop(Plane, n, Squares) ≥ 12n−4
Comparing our lower bounds to the upper bounds of Section 3 reveals several gaps waiting
to be closed. First, we currently don’t know how to generalize the staircase technique to an
arbitrary rectilinear polygon or to a square with all sides bounded, so we don’t know if the
proportionality coefficient for is 2 (as in the impossibility result) or 4 (as in the algorithm of
subsection 4.3). Second, for an unbounded plane we currently only have the trivial upper bound
1
n
, so we don’t know if the proportionality coefficient is 1 or 2 (as in Theorem 2). Additionally,
we don’t know how to generalize the staircase technique to three or more dimensions, so we have
a gap with the upper bounds of Section 3.
An open question which we find most intriguing is: does there always exist a proportional
division when the cake is unbounded and the pieces are convex (not necessarily rectangular) fat
shapes? We conjecture that the answer is negative and that the proportionality coefficient when
the pieces are d-dimensional fat shapes is d.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We defined a problem of fair cake-cutting with geometric constraints, inspired by the task of
fairly dividing multi-dimensional land resources. We presented several proof techniques and
algorithmic methods for achieving a partially-proportional division in various scenarios. Our
main proportionality results are summarized in the appendices in Table 1. Some of our division
algorithms were implemented. An on-line demo is available in which the user can generate
random value measures specified by interest points and verify that the resulting division indeed
satisfies the partial-proportionality guarantees. 7
The new cake-cutting problem introduced in this paper has a large potential for future
research. First, still in the realm of proportionality, it is possible to extend the problem definition
by allowing each player to have a different geometric constraint (a different family S of usable
shapes). Additionally, instead of defining partial proportionality relative to the total value of
the entire cake, it is possible to define it relative to the total usable value that a single player
7http://162.243.116.217/geometry/fair-division.html
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can derive when given the entire cake. This could potentially lead to different algorithms and
techniques.
In addition to proportionality, every problem that has been studied with relation to the
classic cake-cutting problem can be studied again with the additional geometric constraints.
This includes, in particular: envy-freeness, social welfare maximization, computational efficiency
and truthfulness.
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A Proofs of impossibility results
Claim 3.1: For every n ≥ 1, Prop(Quarter plane, n, Squares) ≤ 12n−1 .
Proof. Assume the cake is the north-eastern quadrant [0,∞) × [0,∞). It is sufficient to prove
that for every n there is an arrangement of 2n − 1 square pools in that quadrant such that at
most n − 1 disjoint squares intersect two or more pools. The proof is by induction on n. The
case n = 1 is trivial and the case n = 2 was already proved (see Figure 1/Middle). Assume
there is such an arrangement with 2(n − 1) − 1 square pools. Shrink the entire arrangement
towards the origin until it is contained in the square [0, ǫ] × [0, ǫ], where ǫ > 0 is a sufficiently
small constant. Add two new square pools with side-length ǫ cornered at (1, 0) and (0, 1). We
now have an arrangement of 2n−1 pools. By the induction assumption, there are at most n−2
disjoint squares intersecting two pools in the shrunk square. Each square intersecting one of the
new pools and another pool (either new or old) must have side-length at least 1 − 2ǫ; at most
one such square fits into C. The total number of squares is thus at most n− 1. Figure 1/Right
illustrates the construction for n = 3, having 5 pools where at most 2 disjoint squares intersect
two pools.
Claim 3.3: Let C be a rectilinear polygon and let k = IndepNum(C,Squares). Then for every
n ≥ 1: Prop(C, n, Squares) ≤ 12n−2+k
Proof. Let I be an independent set of k square pools in C. Let c be a certain convex corner of C
(a corner with internal angle 90◦). Let s be a maximal square having c as one of its corners. By
definition of independent set, s covers at most one square pool from I. Remove that pool from I.
Now there is a small square subset of s, adjacent to the corner c, that is disjoint from any square
containing a pool from I. Put inside that area a set J of 2n − 1 pools constructed as in Claim
3.1. No square in C intersects two pools from I, or a pool from I and a pool from J . At most
n−1 squares in C intersect two pools from J . Hence we have now (2n−1)+(k−1) = 2n−2+k
pools with at most n − 1 squares intersecting two or more of them. Figure 2/Right illustrates
the construction for k = 3 and n = 3, having 7 pools where at most 2 disjoint squares intersect
two pools.
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Algorithm 1 Partitioning Players to Rooms. A generalization of Culter [2013].
INPUT: A group of players N = {1, ..., n} and a set of parts M = {1, ...,m}.
for every i ∈ N , a set of m non-negative integers P ij (with j ∈M) such that Σj∈MP ij ≥ n.
OUTPUT: A partitioning of N to m disjoint groups Gj (some possibly empty) such that for
every i ∈ N, j ∈M : i ∈ Gj =⇒ P ij ≥ |Gj |.
ALGORITHM:
- Initialize Gm := φ.
- Order the players in decreasing order of P im.
- While P im > |Gm|: let Gm := Gm ∪ {i}.
- Recursively call the algorithm with the players in N \Gm and the parts in M \ {m}.
B Partitioning Players to Rooms
Suppose there are n players and m rooms. Each player i ∈ {1, ..., n} provides m numbers P ij
summing up to at least n: ∀i : Σmj=1P ij ≥ n. P stands for “partners” and represents the number
of players with which the player i is willing to share room number j. Algorithm 1, which is a
generalization of an algorithm by Culter [2013], can be used to divide the players into rooms
in a way that respects their preferences, i.e. for every player i in room j, the total number of
players in room j is at most P ij .
Proof. The algorithm fills the rooms Gj one after the other recursively. The pre-condition at the
beginning of each recursive iteration is the requirement ∀i : Σmj=1P ij ≥ n. When the while-loop
terminates, all players in Gm have P
i
m ≥ |Gm| and all players not in Gm have P im ≤ |Gm|.
Because of the pre-condition, for every player i not in Gm: Σ
m−1
j=1 P
i
j ≥ n− |Gm|. Hence, we can
call our algorithm recursively with the n− |Gm| remaining players and fill the remaining m− 1
rooms.
C Introduction to Flow-Charts and Tables
This appendix aims to make the division algorithms of Section 4 more understandable by pro-
viding intuitive flow-charts describing the division process. In each flow-chart:
• Dashed lines are lines drawn by the protocol during eval queries;
• Dotted lines are lines drawn by the players during mark queries;
• Solid lines are cuts made by the protocol after processing the answers to queries;
• The numbers k1, k2 etc. are the numbers of players in the groups G1, G2 etc.
Not all cases are shown; some cases are omitted because they are symmetrically similar to the
illustrated cases. The red text hints at how the constants in the Prop formula were calculated.
In addition to the flow-charts, we describe the algorithms in tables in which:
• The left column describes the protocol steps. A square  next to a protocol step means
that the protocol ends at that step.
• The right column describes the corresponding safe strategy for a single player Alice/George.
The right column also contains the proof that the safe strategy indeed fulfills the propor-
tionality guarantee.
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D Dividing a Square to Squares (see Claim 4.1 and Figure 5)
INPUT: A square cake C, assumed to be [0, 1]× [0, 1] . n ≥ 1 with ∀i : Vi(C) ≥ max(1, 6n− 8).
OUTPUT: n disjoint squares contained in C such that ∀i : Vi(Pi) ≥ 1.
Protocol Safe strategy for George and proof that it works
If n = 1: give the entire cake to the single player.  V (C) ≥ 1 and C is a square.
Eval query: Partition the square cake C to four
quarters, {Cj}
4
j=1, in a grid of 2× 2. Ask each player to
evaluate each quarter by inputting the integers
{P ij }
4
j=1,
n
i=1. Partition the players to 4 groups Gj using
Algorithm 1.
(a) If V (Cj) > V (C)− 3 then let Pj = n; (b) If
V (Cj) < 1 then let Pj = 0; (c) Otherwise let
Pj = ⌊
V (Cj)+8
6
⌋. To prove that the strategy complies
with the protocol rules, let k be the number of
sub-cakes with V (Cj) < 1. Obviously k ≤ 3. If k = 3
then the 4th quarter has value more than V (C)− 3 so
its Pj is n and the rules are kept. If k = 2 then the
total value of the remaining quarters is more than
V (C)− 2 = 6n− 10 and
Σmj=1Pj >
Σ2j=1(V (Cj)+8)
6
− 2 = 6n−10+2·8
6
− 2 = n− 1;
hence the sum must be n in accordance with the
protocol rules. The cases k = 1, 0 are similar (in fact,
the constants 6 and 8 were calculated based on the case
k = 2, which happens to be the worst case here).
If the number of players in all groups is less than n,
then cut the cake to 4 quarters using two guillotine cuts
and divide each quarter recursively to the players in its
group. 
By (b), if George is alone in a group then V (Cj) ≥ 1; by
(c), if George is with at most Pj < n players then
V (Cj) ≥ 6Pj − 8 .
Otherwise, all n players are in a single group; w.l.o.g,
assume it is the group corresponding to the
south-western square [0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
]. Proceed with a
mark query: Ask each player i to bid an L-shape by
drawing a corner square si at the south-western corner.
Bid an L-shape with value exactly 3. Note George can
get here only by saying Pj = n, which by (a-c) above
implies that V (C \ [0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
]) ≤ 3.
Pick a smallest L-shape CL and allow its bidder to
select a single square.
Select a square with value 1. Note that George can get
here only if V (CL) = 3. CL is an L-shape coverable by
3 squares so by the Covering Lemma George can get a
square with value 1.
Divide C \ CL recursively among the remaining n− 1
players. 
George can get here only if
V (C \ CL) ≥ V (C)− 3 = 6n− 11 > 6(n− 1)− 8.
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Divide to n
Vn = An − B
V1 = 1; V2 = 4
k4 k3
k1 k2
∃i : ki = n else
∑4
i=1 ki = n
select smallest L-shape
Divide
to k4
Divide
to k1
Divide
to k3
Divide
to k2
Vn ≥ Vk1
+ Vk2 + Vk3 + V3+k4
⇒ 3B ≥ 3A
Divide
to k4
Divide
to k3
Vn ≥ 1 + 1 + Vk3 + V1+k4
⇒ B ≥ A + 2
Divide
to
n-1
G
ive
to
1
Vn ≥ 3 + Vn−1
⇒ A ≥ 3
Divide
to k4
Divide
to k3
Divide
to k2
Vn ≥ 1 + Vk2 + Vk3 + V2+k4
⇒ 2B ≥ 2A + 1
Divide
to k1
Divide
to k3
Vn ≥ 1 + 1 + Vk3 + V1+k4
⇒ B ≥ A + 2
Figure 5: Dividing a square to squares. See details near Claim 4.1.
INPUT: A square and n players that value it as Vn ≥ 6n− 8.
OUTPUT: Each player can get a square with value ≥ 1.
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E Dividing a 2-fat rectangle to 2-fat rectangles (see Figure 6)
INPUT: A 2-fat rectangle C, assumed to be [0, L] × [0, 1] with L ∈ [1, 2] . n ≥ 1 with ∀i :
Vi(C) ≥ max(1, 4n − 5).
OUTPUT: n disjoint 2-fat rectangles contained in C such that ∀i : Vi(Pi) ≥ 1.
Protocol Safe strategy for George and proof that it works
If n = 1: give the entire cake to the single player.  V (C) ≥ 1 and C is a 2-fat rectangle.
Eval query: Partition C along its longer side to a
western half (x ≤ L
2
) and an eastern half. Ask each
player to evaluate each half by inputting two integers
summing up to n. Partition the players to two groups
using Algorithm 1.
(a) If V (Cj) > V (C)− 1 then let Pj = n;
(b) If V (Cj) < 1 then let Pj = 0;
(c) Otherwise let Pj = ⌊
V (Cj)+5
4
⌋. Note
V (Cj)+1
4
< Pj
so the sum P1 + P2 is larger than
V (C)+2
4
> n− 1, hence
the sum is at least n.
If the number of players in all groups is less than n then
make a vertical cut at x = L
2
. The two halves are 2-fat
rectangles. Use the 4 walls algorithm recursively to
divide each half to the players in its group. 
By (b), if George is alone in a group then V (Cj) ≥ 1; by
(c), if George is with at most Pj < n players then
V (Cj) ≥ 4Pj − 5 .
Otherwise, all n players are in a single group; w.l.o.g,
assume it is the group corresponding to the western half
[0, L
2
]× [0, 1]. Proceed with a mark query: Ask each
player i to bid a rectangle [xi, L]× [0, 1]. Let
x∗ = max xi.
Select x such that V ([x, L]× [0, 1]) = 1. Note that
George can get here only by saying Pj = n, which by
(a-c) above implies that V ([0, L
2
]× [0, 1]) > V (C)− 1 so
V ([L
2
, L]× [0, 1]) < 1.
If x∗ ≥ 1
2
then make a vertical cut at x∗ and give the
eastern part to its bidder.
If this player is George, then by his selection of x he
receives a 2-fat rectangle with value 1.
The western part is a 2-fat rectangle; recursively divide
it among the remaining n− 1 players. 
If George is one of these players, then by his selection of
x the value of the western part is at least
4n− 6 > 4(n− 1)− 5.
Otherwise (∀i : xi <
1
2
), proceed with an Eval query:
partition the “far west” of C (x ≤ 1
2
) to two squares:
[0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
] and [0, 1
2
]× [ 1
2
, 1]. Input two integers from
each player and partition the players to two groups
using Algorithm 1.
(d) If V (Cj) > V (C)− 2 then let Pj = n;
(e) If V (Cj) < 1 then let Pj = 0;
(f) Otherwise let Pj = ⌊
V (Cj)+5
4
⌋. Note George can get
here only by saying x < 1
2
, which implies
V (C1) + V (C2) = V ([0,
1
2
]× [0, 1]) > V (C)− 1. Hence if
one square has V < 1 then the other square has
V > V (C)− 2. Also
V (Cj)+1
4
< Pj so
P1 + P2 >
V (C)+2−1
4
= n− 1 and the sum is at least n.
If the number of players in all groups is less than n then
make a horizontal cut at y = 1
2
. Recursively divide each
square to the players in its group. 
By (e), if George is alone in a group thenV (Cj) ≥ 1; by
(f), if George is with at most Pj < n players then
V (Cj) ≥ 4Pj − 5 .
Otherwise, all n players are in a single group; w.l.o.g,
assume it is the group corresponding to the
south-western square [0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
]. Proceed with a
mark query: Ask each player i to bid an L-shape by
drawing a corner square si at the south-western corner.
Bid an L-shape with value exactly 2. Note George can
get here only by saying Pj = n, which by (d-f) above
implies that V (C \ [0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
]) ≤ 2.
Select the smallest L-shape CL. Let its bidder select
either its east or its north. Separate the selected part
from C \ CL using a single guillotine cut and give it its
bidder.
Select the east if its value is at least 1; select the north
otherwise. Note George can get here only if V (CL) = 2,
so either the east or the north must have value at least
1. Both are 2-fat rectangles.
Recursively divide C \ CL among the remaining n− 1
players. 
George can get here only if
V (C \ CL) ≥ V (C)− 2 = 4n− 7 > 4(n− 1)− 5.
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Divide to n
Vn = An − B
V1 = 1; V2 = 3
k players n-k players
k = n 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 Vn ≥ (A(k + 1)− B) + (A(n− k)− B)
⇒ B ≥ A
max xi <
1
2
max xi ≥ 12
L/2
Divide
to k
Divide
to n-k
Vn ≥ V2 + (A(n − 1) − B)
⇒ A ≥ 3
1/2
n-m
players
m
players
m = n 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1
maxxi
Divide
to n-1
Give
to 1
Vn ≥ V1 + (A(k + 1) − B) + (A(n − k)− B)
⇒ B ≥ 1 +A
1/2
Divide
to n-m
Divide
to m
Vn ≥ V1 + V2 + (A(n − 1)− B)
⇒ A ≥ 4
Divide
to
n-1
Give to 1
Figure 6: Dividing a 2-fat rectangle to 2-fat rectangles (Claim 4.2).
INPUT: A 2-fat rectangle and n players that value it as Vn ≥ 4n− 5.
OUTPUT: Each player can get a 2-fat rectangle with value ≥ 1.
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F Quarter-proportional division with guillotine cuts
We prove Claim 4.3 by describing a pair of algorithms calling each other recursively. All algo-
rithms get as input:
• A cake C which is assumed to be the rectangle [0, L]× [0, 1];
• n players with different continuous value measures {Vi}ni=1.
All algorithms return as output n square plots {Pi}ni=1, such that ∀i : Vi(Pi) = 1.
The algorithms differ in the number of “walls” (bounded sides): in the 4 walls algorithm, all
output squares should be contained in C, while in the 3 walls algorithm, some output squares
may flow over the eastern border x = L, although there is no value in the range x > L.
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F.1 4 Walls Algorithm (see Figure 7)
PRE-CONDITIONS: C is a 2-fat rectangle (1 ≤ L ≤ 2). ∀i : Vi(C) ≥ max(2, 4n − 4). n ≥ 1.
POST-CONDITION: All n output squares are contained in C = [0, L]× [0, 1].
Protocol Safe strategy for Alice and proof that it works
If n = 1: give the entire cake to the single player.  V (C) ≥ 2 and C is 2-fat.
Eval query: Partition C along its longer side to a
western half (x ≤ L
2
) and an eastern half. Ask each
player to evaluate each half by inputting two integers
summing up to n. Partition the players to two groups
using Algorithm 1.
(a) If V (Cj) > V (C)− 2 then let Pj = n;
(b) If V (Cj) < 2 then let Pj = 0;
(c) Otherwise let Pj = ⌊
V (Cj)+4
4
⌋. Note
V (Cj)
4
< Pj so
the sum P1 + P2 is larger than
V (C)
4
= n− 1, hence the
sum is at least n.
If the number of players in all groups is less than n then
make a vertical cut at x = L
2
. The two halves are 2-fat
rectangles. Use the 4 walls algorithm recursively to
divide each half to the players in its group. 
By (b), if Alice is alone in a group then V (Cj) ≥ 2; by
(c), if Alice is with at most Pj < n players then
V (Cj) ≥ 4Pj − 4 .
Otherwise, all n players are in a single group; w.l.o.g,
assume it is the group corresponding to the western half
[0, L
2
]× [0, 1]. Proceed with a mark query: Ask each
player i to bid a rectangle [xi, L]× [0, 1]. Let
x∗ = max xi.
Select x such that V ([x, L]× [0, 1]) = 2. Note that Alice
can get here only by saying Pj = n, which by (a-c)
above implies that V ([0, L
2
]× [0, 1]) > V (C)− 2 so
V ([L
2
, L]× [0, 1]) < 2.
If x∗ ≥ 1
2
then make a vertical cut at x∗ and give the
eastern rectangle to its bidder.
If this player is Alice, then by her selection of x she
receives a 2-fat rectangle with value 2.
The western part is a 2-fat rectangle; use the 4-walls
algorithm to divide it among the remaining n− 1
players. 
If Alice is one of these players, then by her selection of
x the value of the western part is at least
4n− 6 > 4(n− 1)− 4.
Otherwise (∀i : xi <
1
2
), proceed with an Eval query:
partition the “far west” of C (x ≤ 1
2
) to two squares:
[0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
] and [0, 1
2
]× [ 1
2
, 1]. Input two integers from
each player and partition the players to two groups
using Algorithm 1.
(d) If V (Cj) > V (C)− 3 then let Pj = n;
(e) If V (Cj) < 1 then let Pj = 0;
(f) Otherwise let Pj = ⌊
V (Cj)+5
4
⌋. Note Alice can get
here only by saying x < 1
2
, which implies
V (C1) + V (C2) = V ([0,
1
2
]× [0, 1]) > V (C)− 2. Hence if
one square has V < 1 then the other square has
V > V (C)− 3. Also
V (Cj)+1
4
< Pj so
P1 + P2 >
V (C)+2−2
4
= n− 1 and the sum is at least n.
If the number of players in all groups is less than n then
make a horizontal cut at y = 1
2
. Use the 3-walls
algorithm to divide each square to the players in its
group. The output squares may flow over the eastern
border of the squares (x = 1
2
), but this is harmless as
there are no other squares there. 
By (e), if Alice is alone in a group thenV (Cj) ≥ 1; by
(f), if Alice is with at most Pj < n players then
V (Cj) ≥ 4Pj − 5 .
Otherwise, all n players are in a single group; w.l.o.g,
assume it is the group corresponding to the
south-western square [0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
]. Proceed with a
mark query: Ask each player i to bid an L-shape by
drawing a corner square si at the south-western corner.
Bid an L-shape with value exactly 3. Note Alice can get
here only by saying Pj = n, which by (d-f) above
implies that V (C \ [0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
]) ≤ 3.
Select a smallest L-shape, CL. Let its bidder select
either its east or its north. Separate the selected part
from C \ CL using a single guillotine cut and give it to
its bidder.
Select the east, which is a 2-fat rectangle, if its value is
at least 2; select the north, which is a square, otherwise.
Note Alice can get here only if V (CL) = 3, so if the
north is selected its value is at least 1.
Now either the north or the east of CL are unused; use
the 3-walls algorithm in the appropriate direction to
divide C \ CL among the remaining n− 1 players. 
Alice can get here only if
V (C \ CL) ≥ V (C)− 3 = 4n− 7 > 4(n− 1)− 5.
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Figure 7: 4 Walls Algorithm.
INPUT: A 2-fat rectangle with all 4 sides bounded; n players that value it as V Dn ≥ 4n− 4.
OUTPUT: Each player can get a square with value ≥ 1.
This algorithm uses the algorithm illustrated in Figure 8 to divide a square unbounded in one side.
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F.2 3 Walls Algorithm (see Figure 8)
PRE-CONDITIONS: C is an arbitrary rectangle with L ≤ 1. For every player i:Vi(C) ≥
max(1, 4n − 5). n ≥ 1.
POST-CONDITION: All n output squares are contained in [0, L+1]× [0, 1], i.e.: they are within
three walls of C but may flow over the eastern wall x = L.
Protocol Safe strategy for Alice and proof that it works
If n = 1: give to the single player the square
[0, 1]× [0, 1]. 
V (C) ≥ 1 and C is contained in the allocated square.
mark query: Ask each player i to bid a square
[xi, xi + 1]× [0, 1] where xi ∈ [0, L]. Let x
∗ = max xi.
Bid a square with value 1 by selecting x such that
V ([x,L]× [0, 1]) = 1. Note that
V ([x,L]× [0, 1]) = V ([x, x+ 1]× [0, 1]).
If x∗ ≥ 1
2
then make a vertical cut at x∗. Give the
eastern square [x∗, x∗ + 1]× [0, 1] to its bidder.
If this player is Alice, then by her selection of x she
receives a square with value 1.
The western part is a 2-fat rectangle; use the 4-walls
algorithm to divide it among the remaining n− 1
players. 
If Alice is one of these players, then by her selection of
x the value of the western part is at least
4n− 6 > 4(n− 1)− 4.
Otherwise (∀i : xi <
1
2
), proceed with an Eval query:
partition the “far west” of C (x ≤ 1
2
) to two squares:
[0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
] and [0, 1
2
]× [ 1
2
, 1]. Input two integers from
each player and partition the players to two groups
using Algorithm 1.
(g) If V (Cj) > V (C)− 2 then let Pj = n;
(h) If V (Cj) < 1 then let Pj = 0;
(i) Otherwise let Pj = ⌊
V (Cj)+5
4
⌋. Note Alice can get
here only by saying x < 1
2
, which implies
V (C1) + V (C2) = V ([0,
1
2
]× [0, 1]) > V (C)− 1. Hence if
one square has V < 1 then the other square has
V > V (C)− 2. Also
V (Cj)+1
4
< Pj so
P1 + P2 >
V (C)+2−1
4
= n− 1 and the sum is at least n.
If the number of players in all groups is less than n then
make a horizontal cut at y = 1
2
. Use the 3-walls
algorithm to divide each square to the players in its
group. The resulting squares are contained in
[0, 1]× [0, 1
2
] and [0, 1]× [ 1
2
, 1], which are both contained
in [0, L+ 1]× [0, 1]. 
By (h), if Alice is alone in a group thenV (Cj) ≥ 1; by
(i), if Alice is with at most Pj < n players then
V (Cj) ≥ 4Pj − 5.
Otherwise, all n players are in a single group; w.l.o.g,
assume it is the group corresponding to the
south-western square [0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
]. Proceed with a
mark query: Ask each player i to bid an L-shape by
drawing a corner square si at the south-western corner.
Bid an L-shape with value exactly V (C)− 2. Note Alice
can get here only by saying Pj = n, which by (g-i)
above implies that V (C \ [0, 1
2
]× [0, 1
2
]) ≤ 2.
Select a smallest L-shape, CL. Let its bidder select
either its east or its north. Separate the selected part
from C \ CL using a single guillotine cut and give it to
its bidder.
Select the east, in which a square can be allocated, if its
value is at least 1; select the north, which is a square,
otherwise. Note Alice can get here only if V (CL) = 2,
so if the north is selected its value is at least 1. Both
the east and the north are squares.
Now either the north or the east of CL are unused; use
the 3-walls algorithm in the appropriate direction to
divide C \ CL among the remaining n− 1 players. The
output squares are contained either in [0, 1
2
]× [0, 1] or in
[0, 1]× [0, 1
2
], which are both contained in
[0, L+ 1]× [0, 1]. 
Alice can get here only if
V (C \ CL) ≥ V (C)− 2 = 4n− 7 > 4(n− 1)− 5.
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Figure 8: 3 Walls Algorithm.
INPUT: A rectangle with one of the long sides unbounded; n players that value it as V Cn ≥ 4n− 5.
OUTPUT: Each player can get a square with value ≥ 1.
This algorithm uses the algorithm illustrated in Figure 7 to divide a square bounded in all sides.
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G Staircase algorithm
Claim 4.6: If C is a rectilinear polygonal domain with two unbounded sides having k corners,
then Prop(C,n, Squares) = 12n−2+k .
Proof. The following protocol can be used:
(1) Each player i draws a square sji in every corner j ∈ {1, .., k}. Let (xj , yj) be the coordi-
nates of corner j and lji the side-length of square s
j
i .
(2) For every square sji , calculate t
j
i := x
j + yj + lji .
8 The winning square s∗ is a square sji
for which tji is smallest (breaking ties arbitrarily). The winning square is allocated to its owner.
See Fig. 4/Middle-Right.
(3) Discard the shadow of the winning square by cutting from its north-western corner
towards the western boundary of C and from its south-eastern corner towards the southern
boundary of C. Thus the entire box [0, x∗ + l∗]× [0, y∗ + l∗] is removed from the cake. See Fig.
4/Right.
(4) The remainder is a staircase with possibly a different number of corners. Divide it
recursively to the remaining n− 1 players.
For the safe strategy, consider a certain player George who values the entire cake as V (C) ≥
2n− 2+ k. The safe strategy for George is simply to draw all corner squares with value exactly
1 (possibly including squares with infinite side-length). Because V (C) ≥ k, there is at least one
corner such that George values the quarter-plane at that corner as at least 1. Hence he can draw
at least one square. We now prove that the safe strategy guarantees George a value of at least 1.
If the selected square in step (2) belongs to George then we are done. Otherwise, another square
is selected and an entire box is removed from the cake. This removes from the cake a certain
number m ≥ 1 of corners - all corners having (x ≤ x∗ + l∗) ∧ (y ≤ y∗ + l∗). Additionally, two
new corners are added - one with (x ≤ x∗)∧ (y = y∗+ l∗) and one with (y ≤ y∗)∧ (x = x∗+ l∗);
see Figure 4/Right. The new number of corners is thus k + 2−m.
George loses the value contained in the removed box. We now prove that this lost value is
at most m. Partition the removed box to m disjoint rectangular components, starting from the
winning square s∗ and going to the north-west and to the south-east, such that each component
is located in a different corner. The components to the north-west of s∗ are of the form: [x, x∗]×
[y, y∗ + l∗] and the components to its south-east are: [x, x∗ + l∗]× [y, y∗] . The winning square
s∗ itself is a single component; for example, the box corresponding to the blue square in Fig.
4/Middle has three components, in corners 1 2 and 3. We now prove that, for each of the m
removed corners (x, y), if George has drawn a square in that corner then the component of
the removed box in (x, y) is contained in George’s square. We consider first a component to
the north-west of s∗. This is a box: [x, x∗] × [y, y∗ + l∗]. George’s square in that corner, say
[x, x + l] × [y, y + l], was not selected, hence necessarily x + y + l ≥ x∗ + y∗ + l∗. But here
x < x∗ and y < y∗+ l∗, hence necessarily y∗+ l∗ < y+ l and x∗ < x+ l, hence the component is
contained in George’s square. A very similar calculation holds for a component to the south-east
of s∗. For example, in 4/Middle-Right, the winning square is the blue square. Its component in
corner 3 is contained in the cyan square and its component in corner 1 is contained in the green
square.9 Since the value of George’s square in each corner is 1, the value of the component is at
most 1, hence the total value of the removed box is at most m.
This implies that the new value of the cake is at least 2n−2+k−m = 2(n−1)−2+(k+2−m),
which is just the value that George needs in order to recursively divide the remaining cake with
n− 1 players.
8t
j
i can be interpreted as the taxicab distance between the origin to the center of s, or equivalently to the
south-eastern corner of s or the north-western corner of s.
9A similar property incidentally holds also for the cyan square, but not for the green and red squares.
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Cake (C) Usable shapes (S) Impossibility Algorithm
Square, all sides bounded Squares 12n
1
4n−4 (guillotine) *
Square, all sides bounded 2-fat rectangles 12n−1
1
4n−5 (guillotine) *
Rect. polygon, k = IndepNum(C,S) R-fat rectangles 12n−2+k ? *
Quarter-plane (2 unbounded sides) Squares 12n−1
1
2n−1 (staircase)
Rect. polygon, 2 unb. sides, k corners Squares 12n−2+k
1
2n−2+k (staircase)
Half-plane (3 unbounded sides) Squares 1
⌈ 3n
2
⌉−1
1
2n−2 (staircase) *
Plane (4 unbounded sides ) Squares 1
n
1
2n−4 (staircase) *
L× 1 rectangle (L > 1) R-fat rectangles 1
2n−2+⌈ L
R
⌉
1
4n−6+⌈max(2,L)
R
⌉
*
d-cube with δ unbounded sides d-cubes 1
d(n−2)+(2d−δ+δ)
1
(2d−1+2)(n−2)+(2d−δ+δ)
*
Table 1: Bounds on the partial-proportionality Prop(C, n, S) in several geometric scenarios.
Impossibility results (upper bounds) are explained in Section 3. Algorithms (lower bounds) are explained
in Section 4. Stars in the rightmost column denote scenarios in which we have open questions.
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